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Introduction
Water and sewerage services are usually provided in monopoly regimes. Hence, as other network industries, the water and sewerage industry in many countries is regulated following different approaches (Worthington, 2014; Molinos-Senante et al. 2015) . As water supply is a large market covering more than 99% of the population, the potential welfare effects of prices set at levels that do not represent the cost of production are potentially important. Apart from transfers between consumers and producers, the pricing of a good can lead to a deadweight loss, i.e. a loss of economic efficiency in monetary measure that can occur when the consumer price is not equal to the marginal cost. This question is all the more important as regulation of utilities has been questioned over the last thirty years as several network industries that evolved historically as state-owned enterprises have been privatized (Zhang et al. 2015) .
Regulators can define models of pricing to avoid a loss of economic efficiency. In the ideal case, regulators are completely informed about the costs of the firm and consumer demand elasticities so they can define second-best pricing to ensure a balance budget constraint for the firm and to avoid a deadweight loss (Boiteux 1960) . Because of this lack of information, regulators have to define incentives -such as price-cap schemes -to ensure cost-reduction and consumer access to goods which often have public service characteristics. In this framework developed by Laffont and Tirole (1993) among others, firms want to convince the regulator that they have higher costs than they are actually, in order to have price-caps higher than their cost of production 1 and can capture profits. It creates a deadweight loss from prices that are too high. Under this fixed-price regulatory contract, firms have incentives to fully exploit their cost opportunities by exerting the optimal amount of effort to decrease their cost of production and increase their margins.
Focusing on England and Wales, after the privatization process of the water industry in 1989, the Regional Water Authorities formed the water and sewerage companies (WaSCs) whereas the Statutory Water Companies formed the water only companies (WoCs) (Stone and Webster 2004) . Several studies in the past analysed the impact of privatization and regulation on the efficiency and productivity of water companies only in the water industry 1 Note that cost of production does not consider environmental and resource costs but focused on investment and operational costs.
in England and Wales (Molinos-Senante et al., 2014; Maziotis et al. 2015a; 2015b) . Most of the past evidence therefore refers to the WaSCs where WoCs have always been studied together with WaSCs. We note that WaSCs are responsible for water and sewerage services whereas WoCs are in charge of water supply activities only. Only one study evaluated WoC's performance over the period 1995/96 -2004/5 . Hence, in this paper we add to the debate over the impact on regulation on the performance of WoCs by calculating the welfare costs of regulation.
The aim of this study is to analyze the welfare costs of the regulation in the water supply in England and Wales, by computing the deadweight loss of the WoCs providing clean water services that existed over the period of 1993-2009. To achieve this, it is proposed a setting to compute the deadweight loss from non-marginal-cost pricing of marginal water consumption under different assumptions for demand elasticity. Computation of the margins and predictions of the demand of water under different price levels, assuming conservative levels of price-elasticity allow us to report welfare effects estimates from the adoption of the regulation. This methodology is applied on WoCs which are responsible for the supply of drinking water services. This paper contributes to the current strand of literature on water utilities and welfare economics as follows. First, it shows that contrary to other regulated industries and common wisdoms, water supply in the UK has low-margins, even though these low-margins can have strong welfare impacts. Second, it shows that regulation can have efficiency costs for the market as it implies negative profits for the firm. Therefore, the methodology and results of this study are of great interest for both regulators and water utilities managers to evaluate the effectiveness of regulation and make informed decisions. Undoubtedly, the calculations used in the paper could be refined but the analysis shows that profits and losses are not only transfers between producers and consumers but can have important welfare impacts. Therefore, policy makers should particularly be interested by the potential distortions of the current regulatory tools. This paper is also of interest for researchers as our methodological approach is generally applicable and can be expanded to other regulated industries such as coal, electricity, natural gas or even oil. 2
Methodology
It is proposed a simple setting to compute the deadweight loss from non-marginal-cost pricing of marginal water consumption under different assumptions for demand elasticity.
The calculation is based on the standard formula to compute the deadweight loss for each company on a given year :
where 1 is the predicted water consumption at the marginal cost and 0 is the observed water consumption level at current price . 0 , and can directly observed from the dataset 3 . In order to compute 1 , first it is needed to compute how consumption would change after a change in the price from to . The change in consumption ΔQ can be computed using the simple price-elasticity formula:
where  is the price-elasticity of demand. 1 is then computed as the sum of 0 and ΔQ.
Note that demand is a linear curve while supply is supposed to be perfectly elastic. This assumption is realistic as in the water industry, infrastructure for transportation and distribution can be scaled up at near constant marginal cost. It is also then easier to compute the marginal cost as it is not needed a cost function for the water companies.
It is helpful to go through an example to understand the aforementioned computations. For instance, in 2000, company C1 has a margin of 11 cents per cubic meter of water consumed and 11.2 million cubic meters consumed this year. The cost of production per unit is 64 cents and the revenue per unit is 75 cents. Using the formula (1), it is possible to compute the expected demand if the price per unit was 64 cents, i.e. if there were no margins. In this 2 Borenstein and Davis (2012) and Davis and Muehlegger (2011) studied the deadweight loss resulting from non-marginal cost pricing for natural gas in the US. Porcher (2014) applied a similar framework in the French water public service and Davis (2014) discussed the welfare effects of fuel subsidies worldwide. 3 In this study, information on marginal cost and price was no available in the dataset. Hence, additional steps to compute these variables are needed. They are specified in the sample data section.
case, the increase in demand under the hypothesis of a price elasticity of -0.8 would be 1.3 million cubic meters. Hence, the expected demand at the marginal price would imply consumption to be equal to 12.5 million cubic meters for the year 2000. Using the formula of the deadweight loss, the deadweight loss would be equal to: Therefore, the assumptions regarding the water price elasticity of demand in our study are line with the evidence found in past studies. Rather than taking a strong stand on the magnitude of the credible elasticities, it is reported welfare effects estimates for a relative broad range of elasticities which allows narrowing results uncertainty.
Sample Data
Since the privatization of the English and Welsh water industry, there have been several mergers and acquisitions, WaSCs/WoCs and WoCs/WoCs, which resulted in having 21 companies in 2009 -10 WaSCs and 11 WoCs. Being natural monopolies, the economic regulator, the Water Services Regulation Authority (Ofwat) was set up to regulate industry's performance and review water tariffs. The method of regulation has the form of price cap scheme and is designed to both give firms incentives to increase profits by reducing costs and eliminating the potential to manipulate output prices.
As the primary focus of the paper is to determine the welfare costs of the regulation in the The second input considered is labour expressed as the average number of full-time equivalent (FTE) employees which is available from the companies' statutory accounts.
Finally, the third input, namely other costs in nominal terms is defined as the difference between operating costs and total labour costs. Given the absence of data allowing a more refined break down of other costs, it is employed the UK price index for materials and fuel purchased in purification and distribution of water, as the price index for other costs, and simply deflate nominal other costs by this measure to obtain a proxy for real usage of other inputs (Maziotis et al. 2009 
Results
This section describes the results of the setting proposed in the study. It is employed a straightforward exercise by computing the deadweight loss from non-marginal cost pricing of marginal water consumption at different levels of demand elasticity. With non-zero elasticity, volumetric charges above or below the marginal cost impose deadweight loss on the society as customers consume either too much or too little water. It is assumed that consumers do not exit or enter the market and that the deadweight loss observed in the water markets does not cause any distortions in related markets.
A quick overlook at the computed statistics is helpful to understand the amplitude of the deadweight loss. Table 2 reports descriptive statistics per companies such as the margin per unit, observed and predicted consumption under the -0.8 elasticity level and the associated deadweight loss. The larger the amplitude of the margin or the loss, the larger is the gap between the observed and the predicted consumption and the larger is the welfare loss. For example, companies C3 and C12 grossly sell the same volume of water but C3 is close to a nil profit while C12 has pretty high margins of 20 cents per unit sold. Under a -0.8 price elasticity of demand, the average yearly deadweight loss is 46,000 GBP in the case of company C3 while it is 788,000 in the case of C12. it is four times higher with a price-elasticity of -0.8. Table 3 Figures 4 to 6 in the appendix present the total deadweight loss over the period (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) for each company. C10 is the company with the largest deadweight loss over the period, ranging from 3.8 to 15 million GBP depending on the level of the elasticity. The deadweight loss only comes from negative margins. Company C13 is in the opposite situation, provoking a deadweight loss ranging between 1.5 million and 6 million GBP resulting from positive margins over the period. Because margins or losses are pretty low as depicted in Table 2 , the overall deadweight loss per company for the whole 1993-2009 period is usually contained between 500,000 GBP and 2 million depending on the level of the price elasticity. However, for companies experiencing high levels of deadweight loss, the price-cap regulation seems to be tight as we would not expect the company to experience such repeated losses.
Discussion and policy implications
The setting-up of an independent water regulation authority is often seen as an interesting way to promote more pricing efficiency in regulated industries. However, efficient pricing in the UK water industry could have increased the overall surplus by 15 to 61 million GBP over the period of study. Even if these figures represent a small share of the overall turnover of the industry (0.4% in our dataset, similar to the estimates of Garcia and Reynaud (2003) and
Porcher (2014)), this extra-surplus could be used for transfers to the poor or to avoid underinvestment on water networks. During the years 2000-2005, profits substantially decreased as companies were obliged to reduce the prices charged to customers due to the 1999 price review. Average regulated revenues were always below average regulatory costs indicating that the firms were required to eliminate at least some excess costs in order to regain economic profitability.
This study demonstrates that after 2001 the English and Welsh water regulator was more focused on passing productivity benefits to consumers and maintaining stable profitability than it was in earlier regulatory periods. This finding is consistent with past studies by Bottaso and Conti (2003), Erbetta and Cave (2007) and Maziotis et al. (2009) where the authors suggested that the tightened 1999/00 price review had a positive impact on companies' productivity indicating that both the most productive and the less productive firms had strong incentives to improve their productivity in order to regain economic profitability. Another study by Bottasso and Conti (2009) Another paper by Garcia and Reynaud (2003) estimates the benefits of efficient water pricing in France and finds small efficiency gains -roughly 0.4% of initial surplus. The results of the paper can also be compared to those obtained in different industries.
Conclusion
Evaluating the impact of regulation in privatised industries is of great importance for regulators and companies. This is evident in the water industry in England and Wales where WoCs were privatized in 1989 and since then they have been subject to price cap regulation.
In this study, for the first time, it is analysed the welfare costs of the regulation in the water Table 2 . Mean margin per unit, mean consumption, predicted consumption at market price and deadweight loss under a -0.8 price elasticity.
Note: this table presents the mean margin (in GBP), consumption (in thousands of cubic meters), predicted consumption (in thousands of cubic meters) and deadweight loss (in GBP) for each company over the 1993-2009 period under the assumption of a -0.8 price elasticity of demand. For example, under a -0.8 price elasticity of demand, the average deadweight loss of the company C39 over the 1993-2009 period is 338,482 GBP while the average loss per unit made by the company is 7 cents. If the company C39 had price set at the marginal cost, customers would have consume less water, 163 million cubic meters instead of 172 million cubic meters on average per year. Table 3 . Total deadweight loss in GBP under different level of elasticities Note: this table presents the total deadweight loss in GBP per year under different assumption for the elasticity of demand. For example, in 1993, under a -0.2 price elasticity of demand, the total deadweight loss of water only companies is 1.135 million GBP while it is 2.837 million GBP under a -0.5 price elasticity and 4.540 million under a -0.8 price elasticity. The last line of the each column sums the deadweight loss for the whole period. For example, between 1993 and 2009, under a -0.8 price elasticity of demand, the cumulated deadweight loss of the water only companies is 61.525 million GBP.
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